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Secure Communication with a Wireless-Powered
Friendly Jammer
Wanchun Liu, Xiangyun Zhou, Salman Durrani, and Petar Popovski
Abstract—In this paper, we propose to use a wireless-powered
friendly jammer to enable secure communication between a
source node and destination node, in the presence of an eaves-
dropper. We consider a two-phase communication protocol with
fixed-rate transmission. In the first phase, wireless power transfer
is conducted from the source to the jammer. In the second phase,
the source transmits the information-bearing signal under the
protection of a jamming signal sent by the jammer using the
harvested energy in the first phase. We analytically characterize
the long-term behavior of the proposed protocol and derive a
closed-form expression for the throughput. We further optimize
the rate parameters for maximizing the throughput subject to a
secrecy outage probability constraint. Our analytical results show
that the throughput performance differs significantly between
the single-antenna jammer case and the multi-antenna jammer
case. For instance, as the source transmit power increases, the
throughput quickly reaches an upper bound with single-antenna
jammer, while the throughput grows unbounded with multi-
antenna jammer. Our numerical results also validate the derived
analytical results.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, friendly jammer, coop-
erative jamming, wireless power transfer, throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Physical layer security has been recently proposed as a
complement to cryptography method to provide secure wire-
less communications [1], [2]. It is a very different paradigm
where secrecy is achieved by exploiting the physical layer
properties of the wireless communication system, especially
interference and fading. Several important physical layer secu-
rity techniques have been investigated in the past decade (see
a survey article [3] and the references therein). Inspired by
cooperative communication without secrecy constraints, user
cooperation is a promising strategy for improving secrecy
performance. There are mainly two kinds of cooperation:
cooperative relaying and cooperative jamming. As for co-
operative relaying, the well-known decode-and-forward and
amplify-and-forward schemes were discussed in [4–6] with
secrecy considerations. Following the idea of artificial noise
in [7], cooperative jamming was investigated as an effective
method to enhance secrecy [8–16]. In this scheme, a friendly
jammer transmits a jamming signal to interfere with the
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eavesdropper’s signal reception at the same time when the
source transmits the message signal. In [8–10], the authors
focused on the design of a single-antenna jammer. In [11]
and [12], multiple single-antenna jammers were considered
to generate distributed cooperative jamming signals. In [13],
the authors studied multi-antenna jammer (called relay in
[13]) in secure wireless networks. Motivated by this work,
the authors in [14–16] considered multi-antenna jammers in
MIMO (multiple-input and multiple-output) networks.
In many wireless network applications, communication
nodes may not have connection to power lines due to mobility
or other constraints. Thus, their lifetime is usually constrained
by energy stored in the battery. In order to prolong the lifetime
of energy-constrained wireless nodes, energy harvesting has
been proposed as a very promising approach [17], [18]. Con-
ventional energy harvesting methods rely on various renewable
energy sources in the environment, such as solar, vibration,
thermoelectric and wind, thus are usually uncontrollable. For a
wireless communication environment, harvesting energy from
radio-frequency (RF) signals has recently attracted a great
deal of attention [19–21]. A new energy harvesting solution
called wireless power transfer is adopted in recent research
on energy-constrained wireless networks [22–27]. Generally
speaking, the key idea is that a wireless node could capture
RF signal sent by a source node and convert it into direct
current to charge its battery, then use it for signal processing or
transmission. In [22–24], the authors considered the scenario
that the destination simultaneously receives wireless informa-
tion and harvests wireless power transfered by the source.
Motivated by these works, the authors in [25–27] studied
how the wireless nodes can make use of the harvested energy
from wireless power transfer to enable communications. The
wireless power transfer process can be fully controlled, and
hence, can be used in wireless networks with critical quality-
of-service constrained applications, such as secure wireless
communications. In [28], [29], the authors considered secure
communications with one information receiver and one (or
several) wireless energy-harvesting eavesdropper(s). In [30],
the authors studied the coexistence of three destination types
in a network: an information receiver, a receiver for harvesting
wireless energy and an eavesdropper. In [31], the authors
considered the wireless communication network with eaves-
droppers and two types of legal receivers which can receive
information and harvest wireless energy at the same time:
desired receiver and idle receiver, while the idle receivers are
treated as potential eavesdroppers. All these works on secure
communication did not explicitly study how the harvested
energy at the receiver is used.
2B. Our Work and Contribution
This paper considers a scenario that the network designer
wants to establish secure communication between a pair of
source-destination devices with minimal cost. To this end, a
simple passive device is deployed nearby as a helper. Such
a device does not have connection to power line and is
only activated during secure communication. The requirements
of simplicity and low cost bring important challenges: the
helping device should have low complexity in its design and
operation, with a low-cost energy harvesting method to enable
its operation when needed. Consequently, the helping device
should ideally have very little workload of online computation
and minimal coordination or information exchange with the
source-destination pair.
To solve the above-mentioned secure communication design
problem, we propose to use a wireless-powered friendly jam-
mer as the helping device, where the jammer harvests energy
via wireless power transfer from the source node. The energy
harvesting circuit (consisting of diode(s) and a passive low-
pass filter [19], [23]) is very simple and cost effective. More
importantly, such a design allows us to control the energy
harvesting process for the jammer, which is very different
from the conventional energy harvesting methods that rely on
uncontrollable energy sources external to the communication
network. We use a simple time-switching protocol [22], [25],
[32], where power transfer (PT) and information transmission
(IT) are separated in time. In this regard, the time allo-
cation between PT and IT must be carefully designed in
order to achieve the best possible throughput performance.
We solve this problem by optimizing the jamming power,
which indirectly gives the best time allocation for achieving
the maximum throughput while satisfying a given secrecy
constraint. We further optimize the rate parameters of secure
communication. All design parameters are optimized offline
with only statistical knowledge of the wireless channels.
The main contributions of this work are summarized below:
• The novelty of the work lies in the design of a communi-
cation protocol that provides secure communication using
an energy-constrained jamming node wirelessly powered
by the source node. The protocol sets a target jamming
power and switches between IT and PT depending on
whether the available energy at the jammer meets the
target power or not.
• We study the long-term behavior of the proposed com-
munication protocol and derive a closed-form expression
of the probability of IT. Based on this, we obtain the
achievable throughput of the protocol with fixed-rate
transmission.
• We optimize the rate parameters to achieve the max-
imum throughput while satisfying a constraint on the
secrecy outage probability. Further design insights are
obtained by considering the high SNR regime and the
large number of antennas regime. We show that when
the jammer has a single antenna, increasing the source
transmit power quickly makes the throughput converge to
an upper bound. However, when the jammer has multiple
antennas, increasing the source transmit power or the
number of jammer antennas improves the throughput
significantly.
Our work is different from the following most related
studies: In [33], the authors considered a MISO secure
communication scenario, without the help of an individual
jammer. Different from [33], we consider using wireless-
powered jammer to help the secure communication. Therefore,
in our analysis, we study the cooperation of jammer and
source and design the protocol to balance the time spent on
PT and IT, in order to achieve the maximum throughput of
the secure communication. In [32], the authors considered
using a wireless-powered relay to help the point-to-point
communication. Different from [32], we consider a secure
communication scenario. In our analysis, we optimize the
jamming power and rate parameters for secure communication,
which was not considered in [32]. In [34], the authors designed
jamming signal of energy harvesting jammer to help the secure
communication based on the knowledge of the uncontrollable
energy harvesting process. Different from [34], we consider
using wireless-powered jammer where the wireless power
transfer process is totally controllable. In our work, we jointly
design the wireless power transfer process and the communica-
tion process. Therefore, the design approach is fundamentally
different between [34] and our work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model. Section III proposes the secure
communication protocol. Section IV analyzes the protocol and
derives the achievable throughput. Section V formulates an
optimization problem for secrecy performance, and gives the
optimal design. Section VI presents numerical results. Finally,
conclusions are given in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication scenario where a source node
(S) communicates with a destination node (D) in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper (E) with the help of a friendly
jammer (J), as illustrated in Fig. 1. We assume that the jammer
has NJ antennas (NJ ≥ 1), while all the other nodes are
equipped with a single antenna only. Also we assume that
the eavesdropper is just another communication node in the
same network which should not have access to the information
transmitted from the source to the destination. Therefore, the
locations of all nodes are public knowledge.
A. Jammer Model
In this work, the jammer is assumed to be an energy
constrained node with no power of its own and having a
rechargeable battery with infinite capacity [24], [32], [35]. In
order to make use of the jammer, the source node wirelessly
charges the jammer via wireless power transfer. Once the
jammer harvests sufficient energy, it can be used for transmit-
ting friendly jamming signals to enhance the security of the
communication between the source and the destination. We
assume that the jammer’s energy consumption is dominated
by the jamming signal transmission, while the other energy
consumption, e.g., due to the signal processing, is relatively
insignificant and hence ignored for simplicity [23], [26].
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Fig. 1 System model with illustration of the power transfer and
information transmission phases.
B. Channel Assumptions
We assume that all the channel links are composed of large-
scale path loss with exponent m and statistically independent
small-scale Rayleigh fading. We denote the inter-node distance
of links S → J , S → D, J → D, S → E and J → E
by dSJ , dSD , dJD , dSE and dJE , respectively. The fading
channel gains of the links S → J , S → D, S → E,
J → E and J → D are denoted by hSJ , hSD, hSE , hJE ,
hJD , respectively. These fading channel gains are modeled as
quasi-static frequency non-selective parameters, which means
that they are constant over the block time of T seconds
and independent and identically distributed between blocks.
Consequently, each element of these complex fading channel
coefficients are circular symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variance. In this paper, we
make the following assumptions on channel state information
(CSI) and noise power:
• The CSI (hSD and hJD) is assumed to be perfectly
available at both the transmitter and receiver sides. This
allows benchmark system performance to be determined.
• The CSI of the eavesdropper is only known to itself.
• Noise power at the eavesdropper is zero in line with [36],
which corresponds to the worst case scenario.
C. Transmission Phases
The secure communication with wireless-powered jammer
takes places in two phases: (i) power transfer (PT) phase and
(ii) information transmission (IT) phase, as shown in Fig. 1.
During the PT phase, the source transfers power to the jammer
by sending a radio signal with power Ps. The jammer receives
the radio signal, converts it to a direct current signal and stores
the energy in its battery. During the IT phase, the jammer sends
jamming signal to the eavesdropper with power PJ by using
the stored energy in the battery. At the same time, the source
transmits the information signal to the destination with power
Ps under the protection of the jamming signal. We define the
information transmission probability as the probability of the
communication process being in the IT phase and denote it
by ptx.
D. Secure Encoding and Performance Metrics
We consider confidential transmission between the source
and the destination, using Wyner’s wiretap code [37]. Specifi-
cally, there are two rate parameters of the wiretap code, namely
the rate of codeword transmission, denoted by Rt, and the
rate of secret information, denoted by Rs. The positive rate
difference Rt − Rs is the cost to provide secrecy against
the eavesdropper. A M -length wiretap code is constructed
by generating 2MRt codewords xM (w, v) of the length M ,
where w = 1, 2, ..., 2MRs and v = 1, 2, ..., 2M(Rt−Rs). For
each message index w, the value of v is selected randomly
with uniform probability from
{
1, 2, ..., 2M(Rt−Rs)
}
, and the
constructed codeword to be transmitted is xM (w, v). Clearly,
reliable transmission from the source to the destination cannot
be achieved when Rt > Cd, where Cd denotes the channel
capacity of S → D link. This event is defined as connection
outage event. From [37], perfect secrecy cannot be achieved
when Rt − Rs < Ce, where Ce denotes the fading channel
capacity of S → E link. This event is defined as secrecy
outage event. In this work, we consider fixed rate transmission,
which means Rt and Rs are fixed and chosen offline following
[38], [39].
Since we consider quasi-static fading channel, we use
outage based measures as considered in [38], [39]. Specifi-
cally, the connection outage probability and secrecy outage
probability are defined, respectively, as
pco =P {Rt > Cd} , (1)
pso =P {Rt −Rs < Ce} , (2)
where P {ν} denotes the probability for success of event ν.
Note that the connection outage probability is a measure of the
fading channel quality of the S → D link. Since the current
CSI is available at the legitimate nodes, the source can always
suspend transmission when connection outage occurs. This
is easy to realize by one-bit feedback from the destination.
Therefore, in this work, connection outage leads to suspension
of IT but not decoding error at the destination.
Our figure of merit is the throughput, pi, which is the average
number of bits of confidential information received at the
destination per unit time [33], [39], and is given by
pi = ptxRs. (3)
As we will see in Section IV, the information transmission
probability ptx contains the connection outage probability pco.
It is important to note that a trade-off exists between
throughput achieved at the destination and secrecy against the
eavesdropper (measured by the secrecy outage probability).
For example, increasing Rs would increase pi in (3), but also
increase pso in (2). This trade-off will be investigated later in
Section V in this paper.
III. PROPOSED SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a simple fixed-power and
fixed-rate secure communication protocol, which employs a
wireless-powered jammer. Note that more sophisticated power
and rate adaptation strategies at the source are possible but
outside the scope of this paper.
A. Transmission Protocol
We consider the communication in blocks of T seconds,
each block being either a PT or an IT block. Intuitively, IT
4should happen when the jammer has sufficient energy for
jamming and the S → D link is in a good condition to ensure
successful information reception at the destination. We define
the two conditions for a block to be used for IT as follows:
• At the beginning of the block, the jammer has enough
energy, PJT , to support jamming with power PJ over
an information transmission block of T seconds, and
• the link S → D does not suffer connection outage, which
means it can support the codeword transmission rate Rt
from the source to the destination.
Note that both conditions are checked at the start of each
block using the knowledge of the actual amount of energy in
the jammer’s battery and the instantaneous CSI of S → D link,
and both conditions must be satisfied simultaneously for the
block to be an IT block. If the first condition is not satisfied,
then the block is used for PT and we refer to it as a dedicated
PT block. If the first condition is satisfied while the second
condition is not, then the block is still used for PT but we
refer it as an opportunistic PT block. Note that PJ is a design
parameter in the proposed protocol.
For an accurate description of the transmission process, we
define a PT-IT cycle as a sequence of blocks which either
consists of a single IT block or a sequence of PT blocks
followed by an IT block. Let discrete random variables X
and Y (X,Y = 0, 1, 2, ...) denote the number of dedicated
and opportunistic PT blocks in a PT-IT cycle, respectively.
In our proposed protocol, the following four types of PT-IT
cycles are possible:
1) X > 0, Y = 0, i.e., PT-IT cycle contains X dedicated
PT blocks followed by an IT block. This is illustrated as
the kth PT-IT cycle in Fig. 2.
2) X > 0, Y > 0, i.e., PT-IT cycle contains X dedicated
PT blocks and Y opportunistic PT blocks followed by an
IT block. This is illustrated as the (k + 1) th PT-IT cycle
in Fig. 2.
3) X = 0, Y > 0, i.e., PT-IT cycle contains Y opportunistic
PT blocks followed by an IT block. This is illustrated as
the (k + 2) th PT-IT cycle in Fig. 2.
4) X = 0, Y = 0, i.e., PT-IT cycle contains one IT block
only. This is illustrated as the (k + 3) th PT-IT cycle in
Fig. 2.
B. Long-Term Behavior
We are interested in the long-term behavior (rather than
that during the transition stage) of the communication process
determined by our proposed protocol. After a sufficiently long
time, the behavior of the communication process falls in one
of the following two cases:
• Energy Accumulation: In this case, on average, the energy
harvested at the jammer during opportunistic PT blocks is
higher than the energy required during an IT block. Thus,
after a long time has passed, the energy steadily accumu-
lates at the jammer and there is no need for dedicated PT
blocks (the harvested energy by opportunistic PT blocks
fully meet the energy consumption requirement at the
jammer). Consequently, only PT-IT cycles with X = 0
can occur.
• Energy Balanced: In this case, on average, the energy
harvested at the jammer during opportunistic PT blocks
is lower than the energy required during an IT block.
Thus, after a long time has passed, dedicated PT blocks
are sometimes required to make sure that the energy har-
vested from both dedicated and opportunistic PT blocks
equals the energy required for jamming in IT blocks on
average. Consequently, all four types of PT-IT cycles can
occur.
Remarks: Although we have assumed infinite battery capacity
for simplicity in the analysis, it is important to discuss the
effect on finite battery capacity. In fact, our analytical result is
valid for finite battery capacity as long as the battery capacity
in much higher than the required jamming energy PJT .1 To
be specific:
i) When the communication process is in the energy accu-
mulation case, the harvested energy steadily accumulates at the
jammer, thus, the energy level will always reach the maximum
battery capacity after a sufficient long time and stay near the
maximum capacity for the remaining time period. This means
that the energy level in the battery is always much larger
than the required jamming energy level. Thus, having a finite
battery capacity has hardly any effect on the communication
process, as compared with infinite capacity.
ii) When the communication process is in the energy
balanced case, on average, the harvested energy equals the
required (consumed) jamming energy. Therefore, the energy
level mostly stays between zero and the required jamming
energy level, PJT . This also means that the energy level in
the battery can hardly approach the maximum battery capacity.
Thus, having a finite battery capacity has almost no effect on
the communication process, compared with infinite capacity.
Therefore, although our analysis is based on the assumption
of infinite battery capacity, the analytical results still hold with
practical finite battery capacity.
In the next section, the mathematical model for the proposed
protocol is presented. The boundary condition between the
energy accumulation and energy balanced cases is derived. In
Section VI, we will also verify the long-term behavior through
simulations.
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the proposed secure communi-
cation protocol and derive the achievable throughput for the
proposed secure communication protocol.
A. Signal Model
In a PT block, the source sends radio signal xSJ with power
Ps. Thus, received signal at the jammer, yJ is given by
yJ =
1√
dmSJ
√
PshSJxSJ + nJ , (4)
1From [40], for typical energy storage, including super-capacitor or chemi-
cal battery, the capacity easily reaches several Joules, or even several thousand
Joules. While in our work, from the simulation results to be presented later,
the optimal value of required jamming energy is only several micro Joules.
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the battery capacity in practice is much
larger than the required jamming energy.
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Fig. 2 Illustration of four types of PT-IT cycles.
where xSJ is the normalized signal from the source in an PT
block, and nJ is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
at the jammer. From equation (4), by ignoring the noise power,
the harvested energy is given by [22]
ρJ (hSJ ) = η
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√dmSJ
√
PshSJ
∣∣∣∣∣
2
T,
where η is the energy conversion efficiency of RF-DC con-
version operation for energy storage at the jammer. Because
the elements of hSJ are independent identically distributed
complex Gaussian random variable with normalized variance,
we have E
{|hSJ |2} = NJ . Therefore, the average harvested
energy ρJ is given by
ρJ = E {ρJ(hSJ )} = E
{
η
1
dmSJ
Ps |hSJ |2 T
}
=
ηNJPsT
dmSJ
.
(5)
During an IT block, the source transmits information-
carrying signal with the protection from the jammer. The
jammer applies different signaling methods depending on its
number of antennas. When NJ = 1, the jammer sends a noise-
like signal xJD with power PJ , affecting both the destination
and the eavesdropper. When NJ > 1, by using the artificial
interference generation method in [36], the jammer generates
an NJ × (NJ − 1) matrix W which is an orthonormal basis
of the null space of hJD , and also an vector v with NJ − 1
independent identically distributed complex Gaussian random
elements with normalized variance.2 Then the jammer sends
Wv as jamming signal. Thus, the received signal at the
destination, yD, is given by
yD=


√Ps√
dmSD
hSDxSD +
√PJ√
dmJD
hJDxJD + nd, NJ = 1,
√Ps√
dmSD
hSDxSD + nd, NJ > 1,
(6)
where xSD is the normalized information signal from the
source in an IT block and nd is the AWGN at the destination
with variance σ2d. Note that for NJ > 1, the received signal
is free of jamming, because the jamming signal is transmitted
into the null space of hJD .
2With the assumption of zero additive noise at the eavesdropper, the null-
space artificial jamming scheme works when the number of jamming antennas
in larger than the number of eavesdropper antennas, as discussed in [36]. This
condition is satisfied in this work when NJ > 1.
Similarly, the received signal at the eavesdropper, yE , is
given by
yE=


√Ps√
dmSE
hSExSD+
√PJ√
dmJE
hJExJD+ne, NJ=1,
√Ps√
dmSE
hSExSD +
√PJ√
dmJE
hJE
Wv√
NJ − 1
+ne, NJ>1,
(7)
where ne is the AWGN at the eavesdropper which we have
assumed to be 0 as a worst-case scenario.
From (6), the SINR at the destination is
γd =


Ps
dmSD
|hSD|2
σ2d +
PJ
dm
JD
|hJD|2
, NJ = 1
Ps|hSD|2
dmSDσ
2
d
, NJ > 1
(8)
Hence the capacity of S → D link is given as Cd =
log2 (1 + γd).
Since |hSD| and |hJD| are Rayleigh distributed, |hSD|2 and
|hJD|2 are exponential distributed and γd has the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) as
Fγd (x) =

 1−
e
− x
ρd
1 + ϕx
, NJ = 1,
1− e− xρd , NJ > 1,
(9)
where
ϕ =
PJ
Ps
dmSD
dmJD
. (10)
For convenience, we define the SNR at the destination (without
jamming noise) as
ρd ,
Ps
dmSDσ
2
d
. (11)
From (7), the SINR at the eavesdropper is
γe =


1
φ
|hSE |2
|hJE |2 , NJ = 1,
1
φ
|hSE |2
‖hJEW‖2
NJ−1
, NJ > 1,
(12)
where
φ =
PJ
Ps
dmSE
dmJE
. (13)
6Hence, the capacity of S → E link is given as Ce =
log2 (1 + γe). Using the fact that hSE , hJE and the entries
of hJEW are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
complex Gaussian variables, from [33], γe has the probability
density function (pdf) as
fγe (x) =


φ
(
1
φx+ 1
)2
, NJ = 1,
φ
(
NJ − 1
φx+NJ − 1
)NJ
, NJ > 1.
(14)
Using the pdf of γe in (14), the secrecy outage probability
defined in (2) can be evaluated.
B. Information Transmission Probability
Focusing on the long-term behavior, we analyze the pro-
posed secure communication protocol and derive the infor-
mation transmission probability ptx, which in turn gives the
throughput in (3). Note that ptx is the probability of an
arbitrary block being used for IT. As discussed in the last
section, the communication process falls in either energy accu-
mulation or energy balanced case. Thus, ptx will have different
values for the two different cases. First we mathematically
characterize the condition of being in either case in the lemma
below.
Lemma 1. The communication process with the proposed
secure communication protocol leads to energy accumulation
if
pco
1− pco >
PJT
ρJ
(15)
is satisfied. Otherwise, the communication process is energy
balanced.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Using Lemma 1, we can find the general expression for ptx
as presented in Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1. The information transmission probability for the
proposed secure communication protocol is given by
ptx =
1
1 +max
{
PJT
ρJ
, pco1−pco
} , (16)
where
pco =


1− e
− 2
Rt−1
ρd
1 + PJPs
dm
SD
dm
JD
(2Rt − 1)
, NJ = 1,
1− e− 2
Rt−1
ρd , NJ > 1.
(17)
Proof: We first model the communication process in both
energy accumulation and energy balanced cases as Markov
chains and show the ergodicity of the process. This then allows
us to derive the stationary probability of a block being used
for IT either directly or by using time averaging. The detailed
proof can be found in Appendix B.
By substituting (16) in (3), we obtain the achievable
throughput of the proposed protocol.
V. OPTIMAL DESIGN FOR THROUGHPUT
In the last section, we derived the achievable throughput
with given design parameters. Specifically the jamming power
PJ is a design parameter of the protocol. A different value of
PJ results in a different impact on the eavesdropper’s SINR,
hence leads to different secrecy outage probability defined in
(2). Also the rate parameters of the wiretap code, Rt and Rs,
affect the secrecy outage probability. Hence, it is interesting
to see how one can optimally design these parameters to
maximize the throughput while keeping the secrecy outage
probability below a prescribed threshold. In this section, we
present such an optimal fixed-rate design of the proposed
secure communication protocol. The optimization is done
offline, hence does not increase the complexity of the proposed
protocol.
A. Problem Formulation
We consider the optimal secure communication design as
follows:
max
PJ ,Rt,Rs
pi
s.t. pso ≤ ε, PJ ≥ 0, Rt ≥ Rs ≥ 0,
(18)
where ε is the secrecy outage probability constraint. This
design aims to maximize the throughput with the constraint
on the secrecy outage probability.
From (2), the secrecy outage probability should meet the
requirement that
pso = P {Rt −Rs < log2 (1 + γe)} ≤ ε. (19)
By substituting (14) into (19), and after some simplification
manipulations, the jamming power PJ should satisfy the
condition
PJ ≥ PˆJ ,


Ps d
m
JE
dmSE
(
ε−1 − 1)
2Rt−Rs − 1 , NJ = 1,
Ps d
m
JE
dmSE
(NJ − 1)
(
ε
− 1
NJ−1 − 1
)
2Rt−Rs − 1 , NJ > 1.
(20)
From (16), we can see that pi decreases with PJ . Thus, the
maximum pi is obtained when
P⋆J = PˆJ . (21)
The jammer harvests energy from the source in each PT
block. The dynamically harvested and accumulated energy at
the jammer must exceed P⋆JT , before it can be used to send
jamming signal with power P⋆J .
Substituting (21) and (16), into (3), the throughput with
optimal jamming power P⋆J satisfying the secrecy outage
constraint of pso ≤ ε, is given by (22) shown at the top of
next page.
Note that the terms (a) and (b) in (22) are the terms PJT
ρJ
and pco1−pco in Lemma 1, respectively. Thus, if we choose
(Rt, Rs) to make (a) > (b), the communication process
is energy balanced; while if (Rt, Rs) make (a) ≤ (b), the
communication process leads to energy accumulation. For an-
alytical convenience, we define three 2-dimension rate regions:
D1 , {(Rt, Rs) |(a) < (b), Rt ≥ Rs ≥ 0} , (23)
7pi (P⋆J ) =


Rs
1+max


dmSJ
η
dmJE
dmSE
(
ε−1− 1)
2Rt−Rs−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
, e
(2Rt−1)
ρd
(
1+
dmJE
dmSE
dmSD
dmJD
(
ε−1 − 1)
2Rt−Rs − 1
(
2Rt−1)
)
− 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)


, NJ = 1,
Rs
1 + max


dmSJ
NJη
dmJE
dmSE
(NJ − 1)
(
ε
− 1
NJ−1 − 1
)
2Rt−Rs − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
, e
2Rt−1
ρd − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)


, NJ > 1.
(22)
Dˆ , {(Rt, Rs) |(a) = (b), Rt ≥ Rs ≥ 0} , (24)
D2 , {(Rt, Rs) |(a) > (b), Rt ≥ Rs ≥ 0} , (25)
where rate region Dˆ denotes the boundary between regions
D1 and D2. From the discussion above, if (Rt, Rs) ∈ D1, the
communication process leads to energy accumulation, while
if (Rt, Rs) ∈ D2 ∪ Dˆ, it is energy balanced.
Using (22), the optimization problem in (18) can be rewrit-
ten as
max
Rt,Rs
pi (P⋆J)
s.t. Rt ≥Rs ≥ 0.
(26)
The optimization problem in (26) can be solved with global
optimal solution. The solution for NJ = 1 and NJ > 1 are
presented in the next two subsections.
B. Optimal Rate Parameters with Single-Antenna Jammer
Proposition 1. When NJ = 1, the optimal Rt and Rs can be
obtained by using the following facts:
IF (R⋆t , R⋆s) ∈ D1, i.e., the case of energy accumulation, R⋆s
is the unique root of equation (monotonic increasing on the
left side):
k2
(
2Rs +
2Rs − 1
ξ
)(
Rs ln 2− 1 + Rs ln 2
ξ
)
= 1, (27)
and R⋆t is given by
R⋆t = R
⋆
s + log2 (1 + ξ
⋆) , (28)
where
ξ=
1
2

−k2 (2Rs−1)
1+k22Rs
+

(k2 (2Rs−1)
1+k22Rs
)2
+
4ρdk2
(
1− 12Rs
)
1+k22Rs


1
2

,
(29)
and ξ⋆ is obtained by taking R⋆s into (29).
ELSE, (R⋆t , R⋆s) ∈ Dˆ, i.e., the energy balanced case, and R⋆t
is the root of following equation which can be easily solved
by a linear search:
ζ′
(
1 + k1
ζ
ln 2 (1 + ζ)
− k1 (Rt − log2 (1 + ζ))
ζ2
)
= 1, (30)
where
ζ =
k1 − k2e
2Rt−1
ρd
(
2Rt − 1)
e
2Rt−1
ρd − 1
, (31)
ζ′=
ln 2 e
2Rt−1
ρd(
e
2Rt−1
ρd −1
)2
(
k2 2
Rt
(
1+
1
ρd
−e 2
Rt−1
ρd
)
− k1+k2
ρd
)
,
(32)
k1 =
dmSJ
η
dmJE
dmSE
(
ε−1 − 1), (33)
k2 =
dmJE
dmSE
dmSD
dmJD
(
ε−1 − 1), (34)
and R⋆s = R⋆t−log2 (1 + ζ⋆), where ζ⋆ is calculated by taking
R⋆t into (31).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Note that the optimal (Rt, Rs) never falls in region D2.
This is because the throughput in D2 increases towards the
boundary of D1 and D2, that is Dˆ. The detailed explanation
is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 1 can then be used to obtain the optimal values
of Rt and Rs as follows. We firstly assume the optimal results
are in the region D1, thus, Rs and Rt can be obtained by
equation (27) and (28). Then, we check whether the results
are really in D1. If they are, we have obtained the optimal
results. If not, we solve equation (30) to obtain the optimal
Rt and Rs.
1) High SNR Regime: We want know whether we can
largely improve throughput by increasing the transmit power
at the source, Ps, thus, we consider the high SNR regime.
Note that we have defined SNR at the destination (without the
effect of jamming noise) as ρd in (11).
Corollary 1.1. When NJ = 1 and the SNR at the destination
is sufficiently high, the asymptotically optimal rate parameters
and an upper bound of throughput are given by
R˜⋆s =
1 +W0
(
1
ek2
)
ln 2
, (35a)
R˜⋆t = R˜
⋆
s + log2
(
1 + ξ˜⋆
)
, (35b)
p˜i⋆ =
W0
(
1
ek2
)
ln 2
, (35c)
where k2 is defined in (34),
ξ˜⋆ =

ρdk2
(
1− 1
2R˜
⋆
s
)
1 + k22R˜
⋆
s


1
2
, (36)
8and W0 (·) is the principle branch of the Lambert W func-
tion [41].
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remarks:
i) The upper bound of throughput implies that one cannot
effectively improve the throughput by further increasing
Ps when the SNR at the destination is already high.
ii) It can be checked that when Ps is sufficiently high, the
optimized communication process leads to energy accu-
mulation. Intuitively, this implies that when the available
harvested energy is very large, the jammer should store a
significant portion of the harvested energy in the battery
rather than fully using it, because too much jamming
noise can have adverse impact on SINR at the destination
in this single-antenna jammer scenario. This behavior will
also be verified in Section VI, Fig. 4.
C. Optimal Rate Parameters with Multiple-Antenna Jammer
Proposition 2. When NJ > 1, the optimal Rs and Rt are in
region Dˆ which also means that the optimal communication
process is in the energy balanced case, and the optimal values
are given by
R⋆t = log2 z
⋆,
R⋆s = log2
z⋆
1 + M
e
z⋆−1
ρd −1
, (37)
where z⋆ is calculated as the unique solution of
ρd
z
−ln z+ln
(
1+
M
e
z−1
ρd −1
)
+
Me
z−1
ρd(
e
z−1
ρd −1
)2
+M
(
e
z−1
ρd −1
)=0,
(38)
and
M =
dmSJ
NJη
dmJE
dmSE
(NJ − 1)
(
ε
− 1
NJ−1 − 1
)
. (39)
Proof: See Appendix E.
We can see that the left side of (38) is a monotonic
decreasing function of z. Thus, z can be easily obtained by
using numerical methods.
1) High SNR Regime: Similar to the single-antenna jammer
case, we are interested in whether increasing the source
transmission power Ps, is an effective way of improving
throughput. Hence the high SNR regime is considered:
Corollary 2.1. When NJ > 1 and the SNR at the destination
is sufficiently high, the asymptotically optimal rate parameters
and an upper bound of throughput are given by
R˜⋆t = log2 (2ρd)− log2 (W0 (2ρd)) , (40a)
R˜⋆s =
2W0 (2ρd)
ln 2
− log2 (Mρd) , (40b)
p˜i⋆ = R˜⋆s, (40c)
where z⋆ = 2ρdW0(2ρd) and M is defined in (39).
Proof: See Appendix F.
Remarks:
i) The throughput will always increase with increasing trans-
mit power Ps (because ρd increases as Ps increases). This
is in contrast to the single-antenna jammer case, because
the multi-antenna jamming method only interferes the
S → E link.
ii) From Proposition 2 and Corollary 2.1, when Ps is suf-
ficiently large, the optimized communication process is
still energy balanced, which is different from the single-
antenna jammer scenario. Intuitively, storing extra energy
is not a good choice, because we can always use the
accumulated energy to jam at the eavesdropper without
affecting the destination, which in turn improves the
throughput.
2) Large NJ Regime: We also want to know that whether
we can largely improve the throughput by increasing the
number of antennas at the jammer.
Corollary 2.2. In large NJ scenario, the asymptotically op-
timal rate parameters and an upper bound of throughput are
given by
R˜⋆t =
W0 (ρd)
ln 2
, (41a)
R˜⋆s = log2
eW0(ρd)
1 + M
e
e
W0(ρd)−1
ρd −1
, (41b)
p˜i⋆ =
W0 (ρd)
ln 2 e
1
W0(ρd)
− 1
ρd
, (41c)
where M is defined in (39).
Proof: See Appendix F.
Remark: Corollary 2.2 gives an asymptotic upper bound
on throughput for this protocol, thus, pi does not increase
towards infinity with NJ . Intuitively, the throughput cannot
always increase with NJ , because it is bounded by the S → D
channel capacity which is independent with NJ .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to demon-
strate the performance of the proposed secure communication
protocol. We set the path loss exponent as m = 3 and the
length of time block as T = 1 millisecond. We set the energy
conversion efficiency as η = 0.5 [22], [23], [25]. Note that
the practical designs of rectifier for RF-DC conversion achieve
the value of η between 0.1 and 0.85 [19]. Such a range makes
wireless energy harvesting technology meaningful. A rectifier
design with η < 0.1 is unlikely to be used in practice. We
assume that the source, jammer, destination and eavesdropper
are placed along a horizontal line, and the distances are given
by dSJ = 25 m, dSE = 40 m, dSD = 50 m, dJE = 15
m, dJD = 25 m, in line with [13]. Unless otherwise stated,
we set σ2d = −100 dBm, and the secrecy outage probability
requirement ε = 0.01. We do not specify the bandwidth of
communication, hence the rate parameters are expressed in
units of bit per channel use (bpcu).
To give some ideas about the energy harvesting process
at the jammer under this setting: When NJ = 1 and Ps =
30 dBm, the average power that can be harvested (after
RF-DC conversion) is −15 dBm, thus, the overall energy
harvesting efficiency (i.e., the ratio between the harvested
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Fig. 3 Available energy in battery during the communication process.
power at the jammer and the transmit power at the source)
is (−15 dBm)/(30 dBm) ≈ 3 × 10−5. Note that, although
the average harvested power at the jammer is relatively small,
a small jamming power is sufficient to achieve good secure
communication performance. For instance, the optimal jam-
ming power under this setting is only −13 dBm based on the
analytical results in Section V. In order to transmit the jamming
signal at the optimal power of −13 dBm with the average
harvested power of −15 dBm, roughly 61% of time is used for
charging and 39% of time is used for secure communication
with jamming.
A. Energy Accumulation and Energy Balanced Cases
Fig. 3 shows the simulation results on the available energy
in the battery in the communication process. The jammer has
8 antennas (NJ = 8) and the target jamming power is PJ = 0
dBm. The source transmit power is Ps = 30 dBm. Thus,
the energy consumption in one IT block at the jammer, PJT ,
is 10−6 Joule, and the average harvested energy in one PT
block, ρJ , is 2.56 × 10−7 Joule. From Lemma 1 and (17),
when pco1−pco >
PJT
ρJ
which means Rt > 26.92 bpcu, the
communication process leads to energy accumulation, while
if Rt ≤ 26.92 bpcu, it is the energy balanced.
First, we focus on the curves with infinite battery capacity.
We can see that when Rt = 26.9 bpcu, the available energy
goes up and down, but does not have the trend of energy
accumulation. Thus, the communication process is energy
balanced. When Rt = 26.95 and 27 bpcu, the available energy
grows up, and the communication process leads to energy
accumulation. Therefore, the condition given in Lemma 1 is
verified.
In Fig. 3, we also plot a set of simulation results with
finite battery capacity as Emax = 0.1× 10−3 Joule. As we can
see, for the energy accumulative cases, i.e., Rt = 26.95 and
27.00 bpcu, the energy level stays near the battery capacity
(0.1 × 10−3 Joule) after experienced a sufficient long time,
which is much higher than the required jamming energy level
PJT = 10−6 Joule. Therefore, in practice, having a finite
(a) NJ = 1, Ps = 0 dBm
(b) NJ = 1, Ps = 30 dBm
Fig. 4 Optimal rate parameters for NJ = 1.
battery capacity has hardly any effect on the communication
process, as compared with infinite capacity.
B. Rate Regions with Single-Antenna Jammer
Fig. 4 plots the throughput in (22) with different Rt and
Rs in the single-antenna jammer scenario. In Fig. 4(a), we
set Ps = 0 dBm. The optimal rate parameters (R⋆t , R⋆s) are
obtained in the region Dˆ, which is the boundary of D1 and
D2. This implies that the optimized communication process is
energy balanced. In Fig. 4(b), we increase Ps to 30 dBm. The
optimal rate parameters (R⋆t , R⋆s) are obtained in the region
D1. This implies that the optimized communication process
leads to energy accumulation. This observation agrees with
the remarks after Corollary 1.1 regarding the optimal operating
point when the SNR at the destination is sufficiently large.
C. Throughput Performance with Single-Antenna Jammer
Fig. 5 plots the throughput with optimal designs given by
Proposition 1. We also include the suboptimal performance
which is achieved by using the asymptotically optimal rate
parameters in Corollary 1.1, as well as the upper bound on
throughput in Corollary 1.1.
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Fig. 5 Throughput versus source transmit power Ps for NJ = 1.
First, we focus on the curves with infinite battery capacity.
We can see that when Ps = 5 dBm, the optimal throughput
almost reaches the upper bound. Also we can see that when
Ps < 20 dBm, the suboptimal performance has a large
gap with the optimal one, while when Ps > 20 dBm, the
suboptimal performance is very close to the optimal one.
In Fig. 5, we also plot a set of simulation results with finite
battery capacity as Emax = 0.1
×10−3 Joule. It is easy to see that our analytical results for
infinite battery capacity fit very well with the simulation results
for finite battery capacity. Therefore, a practical finite battery
capacity have negligible effect on the performance of the
protocol, and our analysis are valid in the practical scenario.
D. Rate Regions with Multiple-Antenna Jammer
Fig. 6 plots the throughput in (22) with different Rt and
Rs in the multiple-antenna jammer scenario. In Fig. 6(a) and
Fig. 6(b), we set Ps = 0 dBm and 30 dBm, respectively.
The optimal rate parameters (R⋆t , R⋆s) are both obtained in
the region Dˆ. This implies that the optimized communication
process is energy balanced, which agrees with the remarks
after Corollary 2.1.
E. Throughput Performance with Multiple-Antenna Jammer
Fig. 7(a) plots the optimal throughput from Proposition 2.
We also present the suboptimal performance which is achieved
by the asymptotically optimal rate parameters obtained in
Corollary 2.1. We can see that the throughput increases
with Ps unbounded. Also we can see that the suboptimal
performance is reasonably good when Ps > 20 dBm.
Fig. 7(b) plots the throughput achieved with the optimal
design given in Proposition 2 for different NJ . The source
transmit power is Ps = 30 dBm. We also include the subopti-
mal performance achieved by the asymptotically optimal rate
parameters in the large NJ regime (Corollary 2.2) as well as
the upper bound on throughput in Corollary 2.2.
We can see that with the increment of NJ , although the-
oretically the throughput is upper bounded as NJ → ∞, the
available throughput within practical range of NJ is far from
(a) NJ = 8, Ps = 0 dBm
(b) NJ = 8, Ps = 30 dBm
Fig. 6 Optimal rate parameters for NJ = 8.
the upper bound. Hence, increasing NJ is still an efficient
way to improve the throughput with practical antenna size.
Also we can see that the suboptimal performance is acceptable
but the gap from the optimal throughput performance is still
noticeable.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated secure communication with
the help from a wireless-powered jammer. We proposed a
simple communication protocol and derived its achievable
throughput with fixed-rate transmission. We further optimized
the rate parameters to achieve the best throughput subject to
a secrecy outage probability constraints. As energy harvesting
and wireless power transfer become emerging solutions for
energy constrained networks, this work has demonstrated how
to make use of an energy constrained friendly jammer to
enable secure communication without relying on an external
energy supply. For future work, the protocol can be extended
to include more sophisticated adaptive transmission schemes,
such as variable power transmission with an average power
constraint at the source. Also these schemes can be gener-
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Fig. 7 Throughput for NJ > 1.
alized to multiple antennas at all nodes as well but with a
certain constraint on the receiver noise level or the number
of transmit/receive antennas at the jammer/eavesdropper (as
needed in all physical layer security work). We will explore
these relevant problems in our further work. Also our design
idea can be borrowed and apply other EH method, such as
solar, vibration, thermoelectric, wind and even hybrid energy
harvesting with several energy sources. However, apart from
secure communication performance and EH efficiency, dimen-
sion requirements, implementation complexity, costs should
be considered. Also our design idea can be borrowed and
applied with other EH methods, such as solar, vibration,
thermoelectric, wind, and even hybrid energy harvesting with
several energy sources. However, apart from communication
performance and EH efficiency, dimension requirements, im-
plementation complexity and costs should also be taken into
account in the design.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In one PT-IT cycle, once the available energy is higher than
PJT , there will be Y opportunistic PT blocks. The probability
of the discrete random variable Y being k is the probability
that the successive k blocks, suffer from connection outage of
the S → D link, and the (k + 1)th block does not have the
S → D outage. Due to the i.i.d. channel gains in different
blocks, Y follows a geometric distribution and the probability
mass function (pmf) is given by
P {Y = k} = pkco (1− pco) , k = 0, 1, .... (A.1)
The mean value of Y is given by
E {Y } =
∞∑
k=0
kP {Y = k} =
∞∑
k=0
kpkco (1− pco) =
pco
1− pco .
(A.2)
As we have defined ρJ as the average harvested energy by
one PT block, the average harvested energy by Y opportunistic
PT blocks in one PT-IT cycle is given by
EY = E {Y } ρJ = pco
1− pco ρJ . (A.3)
If the average harvested energy by opportunistic PT blocks in
a PT-IT cycle is higher than the required energy, PJT , for
jamming in one IT block, the communication process leads
to energy accumulation. Otherwise, we need dedicated PT
blocks in some PT-IT cycles, and the communication process
is energy balanced. Thus, we have the condition in Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We derive information transmission probability ptx in the
following two cases.
Energy Accumulation Case: In this case, there are no
dedicated PT blocks. We use a simple Markov chain with two
states, IT and opportunistic PT, to model the communication
process. When the fading channel of S → D link suffers
connection outage, the block is in the opportunistic PT state,
otherwise it is in the IT state. This Markov chain is ergodic
since the fading channel of S → D link is i.i.d. between
blocks. The information transmission probability is simply the
probability that the S → D link does not suffer connection
outage, hence we have
ptx = 1− pco = 1
1 + pco1−pco
. (B.1)
Energy Balanced Case: In this case, the available energy
at the jammer becomes directly relevant to whether a block is
used for IT or PT. Following the recent works, such as [27],
we model the energy state at the beginning/end of each time
block as a Markov chain in order to obtain the information
transmission probability. Since the energy state is continuous,
we adopt Harris chain which can be treated as a Markov chain
on a general state space (continuous state Markov chain).
It is easy to show that this Harris chain is recurrent and
aperiodic, because any current energy state can be revisited
in some future block, and one cannot find any two energy
12
states that the transition from one to the other is periodic.
Therefore, the Harris chain is ergodic [42], and there exists
a unique stationary measure (stationary distribution), which
means that the stationary distribution of available energy at
the beginning/end of each block exists. Thus, the stationary
probability of a block being used for IT (ptx) or PT exists.
Instead of deriving the stationary distribution of energy
states, we use time averaging which makes use of the ergodic
property, to calculate the information transmission probability
ptx which is given by
ptx = lim
Ntotal→∞
NIT
NPT +NIT = limNtotal→∞
1
1 +NPT /NIT ,(B.2)
where NIT and NPT denotes the number of IT and PT blocks
in the communication process,Ntotal , NPT+NIT . By using
the principle of conservation of energy (i.e., all the harvested
energy in PT blocks are used for jamming in IT blocks) and
the law of large numbers, we have
lim
Ntotal→∞
NPT ρJ
NIT PJT = 1, (B.3)
where ρJ is the average harvested energy in one PT block
defined in (5) and PJT is the energy used for jamming in
one IT block. By taking (B.3) into (B.2) the information
transmission probability is given by
ptx =
1
1 + PJT
ρJ
. (B.4)
General Expression: Based on Lemma 1, (B.1) and (B.4),
we can easily obtain the general expression for ptx as
ptx =
1
1 +max
{
PJT
ρJ
, pco1−pco
} . (B.5)
From (1), we have,
pco=P {log2 (1+γd)<Rt}=P
{
γd<2
Rt−1}=Fγd(2Rt−1).
(B.6)
By taking (9) into (B.6), we obtain the expression of pco
in (17).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Case I: If optimal (Rt, Rs) ∈ D1, the optimization problem
can be rewritten as
max
(Rt,Rs)∈D1
pi =
Rs
e
(2Rt−1)
ρd
(
1 + k2(2
Rt−1)
2Rt−Rs−1
) . (C.1)
The optimal (Rt, Rs) should satisfies ∂ π∂ ς = 0 and
∂ π
∂Rs
= 0,
where ς , 2Rt .
Since ς only appears in the denominator of (C.1), by taking
the partial derivative of (C.1) about ς ,
∂ pi
∂ ς
= 0⇔
∂
(
e
(ς−1)
ρd
(
1 + k2(ς−1)ς
2Rs
−1
))
∂ς
= 0, (C.2)
which can be further expanded and simplified as
e
ς
ρd
(
1
ρd
(
1 +
k2 (ς − 1)
ς
2Rs − 1
)
− k2
(
1− 12Rs
)
(
ς
2Rs − 1
)2
)
= 0. (C.3)
Because e
ς
ρd > 0, (C.3) is equivalent to( ς
2Rs
− 1
)( ς
2Rs
−1+k22Rs
( ς
2Rs
−1
)
+k22
Rs
(
1− 1
2Rs
))
− ρdk2
(
1− 1
2Rs
)
= 0.
(C.4)
By using ξ , ς
2Rs
− 1, (C.4) can be further simplified as
ξ2 +
k22
Rs
(
1− 12Rs
)
1 + k22Rs
ξ − ρdk2
(
1− 12Rs
)
1 + k22Rs
= 0, (C.5)
which has a single positive root as (since ξ > 0)
ξ=
1
2

−k2(2Rs−1)
1 + k22Rs
+

(k2 (2Rs−1)
1 + k22Rs
2
+
4ρdk2
(
1− 12Rs
)
1 + k22Rs


1
2

.
(C.6)
Also we have
∂ pi
∂ Rs
=
(
1+
k2(2Rt−1)
2Rt−Rs−1
)
−Rs
(
ln 2 k2 2
Rt−Rs(2Rt−1)
(2Rt−Rs−1)2
)
e
2(2Rt−1)
ρd
(
1 + k2(2
Rt−1)
2Rt−Rs−1
)2 = 0.
(C.7)
Since the denominator of the middle term of (C.7) is greater
than zero, (C.7) reduces to
k2
(
2Rs +
2Rs − 1
ξ
)(
ln 2 Rs − 1 + ln 2 Rs
ξ
)
= 1, (C.8)
where k2 is defined in (34).
Taking (C.6) into (C.8), optimal Rs, R⋆s can be obtained
easily by linear search, since the left side of (C.8) is mono-
tonically increasing with Rs which can be easily proved. The
optimal Rt can be calculated as
R⋆t = R
⋆
s + log2 (1 + ξ
⋆) , (C.9)
where ξ⋆ can be obtained by taking R⋆s into (C.6).
Case II: If optimal (Rt, Rs) ∈ Dˆ∪D2, (22) can be rewritten
as
pi =
Rs
1 + k1
2Rt−Rs−1
. (C.10)
Because pi in (C.10) increases with Rt, optimal Rt and Rs
should be found at the boundary of D1 and D2, that is Dˆ.
Letting (a) = (b), we have
1 +
k1
2Rt−Rs − 1 = e
2Rt−1
ρd +
k2 e
2Rt−1
ρd
(
2Rt − 1)
2Rt−Rs − 1 , (C.11)
which can be further simplified as
2Rs =
2Rt
1 + ζ
, (C.12)
where
ζ =
k1 − k2 e
2Rt−1
ρd
(
2Rt − 1)
e
2Rt−1
ρd − 1
> 0. (C.13)
Thus, from (C.12) we have
Rs = Rt − log2 (1 + ζ) . (C.14)
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By taking (C.14) into (C.10), we have
pi =
Rt − log2 (1 + ζ)
1 + k1
ζ
. (C.15)
By taking the derivative of pi about Rt in (C.15), optimal Rt
should satisfy(
1− 1ln 2 ζ
′
1+ζ
)(
1 + k1
ζ
)
−(Rt−log2 (1 + ζ))
(
−k1
ζ2
)
ζ′(
1 + k1
ζ
)2 =0,
(C.16)
where
ζ′,
dζ
dRt
=
ln 2 e
2Rt−1
ρd(
e
2Rt−1
ρd −1
)2
(
k2 2
Rt
(
1+
1
ρd
−e 2
Rt−1
ρd
)
− k1+k2
ρd
)
.
(C.17)
And (C.16) can be further simplified as
ζ′
(
1 + k1
ζ
ln 2 (1 + ζ)
− k1 (Rt − log2 (1 + ζ))
ζ2
)
= 1. (C.18)
Thus, R⋆t can be calculated as the solution of (C.18), and
from (C.14)
R⋆s = R
⋆
t − log2 (1 + ζ⋆) , (C.19)
where ζ⋆ is calculated by taking R⋆t into (C.13).
Note that, if the optimal (Rt, Rs) for problem (C.1) is
obtained in region D1, they are the optimal rate parameters for
problem (26). This is because, firstly, the above discussion and
derivations show that the optimal rate parameters can only be
obtained in regionD1 and Dˆ. Secondly, by using the continuity
of the function of throughput (22), if the optimal (Rt, Rs)
for problem (C.1) are obtained in region D1, the maximal
throughput in region D1 (i.e., the maximal value of the object
function of (C.1) in D1), is larger than its boundary Dˆ. Thus,
the optimal rate parameters are obtained and fall in region D1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1.1
We consider the asymptotically high SNR regime, i.e., ρd →
∞ or equivalently Ps →∞.
When ρd → ∞, we firstly assume (R⋆t , R⋆s) is obtained in
the region D1. The value of Rs that satisfies (27) cannot go
to infinity regardless of the value of ξ. Thus, we have ξ →∞
as ρd →∞, and (27) can be rewritten as
k22
Rs (ln 2Rs − 1) = 1, (D.1)
where k2 is defined in (34). From (D.1) optimal Rs for the
case ρd →∞ can be calculated as
R⋆s =
1 +W0
(
1
k22
1
ln 2
)
ln 2
=
1 +W0
(
1
ek2
)
ln 2
. (D.2)
From (29), we know that ξ = O
(
ρ
1
2
d
)
= O
(
P 12s
)
, and
because ξ = 2
Rt
2Rs − 1, we have 2Rt = O
(
P 12s
)
. It can be
easily verified that the assumption that optimal (Rt, Rs) ∈ D1
is correct. From Proposition 1 and (22), optimal (Rt, Rs) and
pi is obtained.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Because (a) in (22) decreases with Rt, while (b) increases
with Rt, optimal Rt can be obtained when the two parts
become equal with each other, i.e., optimal (Rt, Rs) ∈ Dˆ.
Thus, optimization problem (26) can be rewritten as
max
Rt,Rs
Rs
1 + max


dm
SJ
NJη
dm
JE
dm
SE
(NJ−1)
(
ε
−
1
NJ−1 −1
)
2Rt−Rs−1
, e
2Rt−1
ρd − 1


s.t.
dmSJ
NJη
dmJE
dmSE
(NJ−1)
(
ε
− 1
NJ−1 −1
)
2Rt−Rs − 1
= e
2Rt−1
ρd − 1, Rt≥Rs≥0.
(E.1)
By solving the equality constraint, we have
2Rs =
2Rt
1 + M
e
2Rt−1
ρd −1
, (E.2)
where M is defined in (39). Certainly, Rt ≥ Rs is satisfied
in (E.2). By taking (E.2) into (E.1), the optimization problem
can be rewritten as
max
Rt≥0
log2

 2Rt
1+ M
e
2Rt−1
ρd −1


e
2Rt−1
ρd
.
(E.3)
Now we use z to denote 2Rt , thus Rt = log2 z. By taking
the derivative of objective function about z in (E.3), and then
setting it equal to 0, optimal z, z⋆ can be calculated as the
solution of (38) which is monotone decreasing function with
z on the left side.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF COROLLARIES 2.1 AND 2.2
When ρd →∞, (38) approximates as 2 ρdz − ln z = 0. Thus,
we have z⋆ = 2ρdW0(2ρd) . From (22) and Proposition 2, the
Corollary 2.1 can be easily obtained. When NJ → ∞, from
(39), we have M = dmSJ
NJη
dmJE
dm
SE
(NJ − 1)
(
ε
− 1
NJ−1 − 1
)
→ 0.
Therefore, (38) approximates to ρd
z
− ln z = 0. Thus, we have
the expression of optimal z in NJ → ∞ regime as z⋆ =
eW0(ρd). From (22) and Proposition 2, Corollary 2.2 can be
easily obtained.
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